(Frank Vargo, the National Association of Manufacturers’s vice president for international economic affairs, has blogged from Geneva this week at the ministerial meeting of the WTO.  This is his final report.)

Ah well, the strangeness and wonder of the WTO negotiating process continues. Consider, for example, the Chairman’s report at the conclusion of the 7th WTO Ministerial meeting that ended yesterday. (Report available here as .doc.)

The report states, “There was wide support for building on progress made to date. There was also support for not attempting to reopen stabilized texts.” (My emphasis.) This statement refers, among other texts, to the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) text that the U.S. has not accepted. The clear implication from yesterday, though, is that many consider the text to be done, agreed, and not to be revisited.

Stabilized texts? Excuse me, but when the NAMA chairman Luzius Wasescha wrote that text at the end of last year, he stated right in his own text that, “Even though the included text is accepted as a basis for further work, we are far from a consensus among Members.” He also added “Anyhow, everything is conditional in the deepest sense.”

Whoa! By what magic elixir do we move from that December statement to the Ministerial Chairman’s statement yesterday that there is strong support for considering the text wrapped up and immutable? Is this sleight of hand? Or does the WTO have all the collective memory of a computer with a fried hard drive?

Example two: Press reports indicate at the end of the conference European officials lamented, “Doha does not seem to be fully on the agenda of the United States … there is no sign today that the Americans are ready to go forward.” (AFP report.) One said, “They want more concessions for a more acceptable package for the US Congress. Now, the problem is to find a way without damaging what has been achieved so far.”

What hypocrisy! In private, European government officials and business representatives are quite free in admitting their analysis conforms perfectly with the U.S. view – they are getting virtually no new market access out of the proposal so far. But they are willing to accept that, because they believe if they were to press for more industrial market access, the developing countries would turn right around and demand more European concessions in agriculture.

That has the Europeans terrified, for they feel they have given all they possibly can in agriculture. One more grain of wheat will break the European back and result in a revolt that will cause them to pull out of the whole deal. So they would rather build Fortress Europe around their agriculture and forgo market access gains in the rest of the world.

Example three: Indian officials still indicate a reluctance to have India participate in sectorals (but not the same degree of “shut-the-door” resistance I saw last year). But at the same time, India has free trade agreements cooking or under discussion with China, Japan, the European Union and Canada – and when India’s Prime Minister visited Washington recently, he indicated a free trade agreement could be possible with the United States as well. So my question is, who’s left? Why can’t you make cuts in the Doha Round?

The problem isn’t that the United States isn’t showing leadership, for it is. I spoke with Ambassador Ron Kirk a couple of times in Geneva this week. He knows the point to the Doha Round is getting meaningful market opening, and he knows the road to Doha goes through Beijing, New Delhi, and Brasilia. The problem isn’t U.S. leadership. The problem is getting others to get off their defensive agendas and join the United States is a commitment to open markets and grow world trade. (continue reading…)

(Frank Vargo, the National Association of Manufacturers’s vice president for international economic affairs, is blogging from Geneva this week at the ministerial meeting of the WTO. )

You know, the process here in Geneva is really interesting. It’s like a plane that forever flies at 50,000 feet and can never get lower. The WTO Doha process just can’t seem to get below the big picture. Ministers from WTO countries are gathered here this week to take stock of the Doha Round, state their political will for a conclusion in 2010, and think of what can be done to move forward. And guess what some of them have come up with? Another ministerial meeting!

They would gather together in Geneva in a couple of months to take stock of where things are, issue serious statements about how things have to move faster –- and probably call for yet another ministerial. If the process were facilitated by ministerial meetings and “mini-ministerials,” we could have had three trade rounds by now.

Fortunately, calling another ministerial meeting in a couple of months is an idea that does not seem to have elicited broad support –- and hopefully won’t before the ministers leave Geneva tomorrow. The U.S. Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, has the right idea – let’s do some work, some eyeball-to-eyeball negotiating and horse-trading, with support from the WTO process. You have to have produce something for the stockroom before you can take stock.

It is rather remarkable, I think, that the gulfs that have prevented agreement are well-known, very visible, have obvious solutions, and yet keep being ignored in terms of a work plan. The WTO negotiating process is a managerial nightmare, lacking substantive goals, management strategies, and tactical plans for achievement. Frankly, the process could benefit from fewer PhD’s and more MBA’s.

The goal of negotiating rounds is to liberalize trade by reducing trade barriers. The Doha Round, in addition, has the goal of creating the maximum new market access for the poorest countries. This is not rocket science. You identify where the market access obstacles are, and you devise plans for reducing or eliminating them.

In the industrial trade negotiations, one thing you have to do is cut tariffs. And if you are going to cut tariffs, you have to go where the tariffs are. And by the WTO staff’s own calculus, about 2/3rds of the tariffs assessed on global industrial trade are collected by the advanced developing countries – especially Brazil, China, and India.

Yet instead of pinpointing reduction of those barriers as a key objective back in 2001, when the round started, as the years passed by, the WTO negotiating process continuously reduced the pressure to cut those tariffs. The consequence has been the prospect of less and less market access for everyone – for the least developed countries, the United States, and everyone in between. (continue reading…)

(Frank Vargo, the National Association of Manufacturers’s vice president for international economic affairs, is blogging from Geneva this week at the ministerial meeting of the WTO. )

The WTO 7th Ministerial Meeting opened yesterday afternoon, with Director General Lamy calling for unity (remarks), and minister after minister urging that the Doha Round conclude in 2010. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk told the gathering not to confuse process for substance and urged countries to call for a round that would generate greater market access for all. (Kirk’s remarks.) There were some signs of support for this, with some ministers referring to ambition and balance, and some suggesting that we should consider different approaches, since we really hadn’t gotten very far. But despite these welcome signs, there has not been what one could call a rising tide demanding a stronger outcome.

Instead of unity, the gulf between those who want a strong outcome and those who want to hold back became even more obvious. Rather than offering any indications the time had come to begin serious negotiations, Brazil’s Minister Amorim instead chose to come out attacking the United States and re-writing history. Amorim accused the United States of “delaying the conclusion of the round because they want to have some few dollars more in some specific sections.” Wrapping Brazil in the flag of the least developed countries, he said that reducing trade barriers would hurt tariff revenues in the poorest countries and impair their ability to cope with climate change obligations. (Reuters coverage.)

What’s wrong with this picture? Well, first, once again Amorim implied that the least developed countries will have to cut their tariffs, which is untrue. Aside from the advanced developing countries like Brazil that have become global export figures, the developing countries don’t have to do anything in the Round.

Second, Amorim again is seeking to promote his revisionist view of Doha history by stating the United States is asking for new concessions, ignoring the multitude of negotiating sessions over the past eight years in which the United States has consistently said the industrial package had to be viewed as a whole – the tariff cutting formula, sectoral agreements, and exceptions from tariff cuts.

There is nothing new here. The United States has pressed consistently for both industrial and advanced developing countries to cut their barriers, while Brazil has wanted to keep its tariff protection. Amorim expressed horror that the United States thinks the Doha Round is about opening markets.

Third, Amorim stated that under what’s on the table now, Brazil is already committed to cut its applied tariff rates more than the United States, so “it is unreasonable to expect that concluding the round would involve additional unilateral concessions from developing countries.” That’s not so.

WTO data show that the formulas would have the United States cut its applied tariffs in half, while Brazil would cut its applied tariffs only by about 1/8 – from an average of 11 percent to about 9.7 percent. Moreover, Brazil’s tariffs would stay at an average of 11 percent for nine years, and only ten years out would fall to 9.7 percent. And, get this – even then only about 40% of Brazil’s tariffs would take any cut at all. What kind of market access is that?

This is what caused former Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Peter Allgeier to once quip that he finally understood what NAMA (Non-Agricultural Market Access) stood for – it meant “No Additional Market Access.”

It is time for Brazil to stop the rhetoric, show the leadership worthy of a major global player, and sit down and negotiate a deal that will have Brazil grant significant new market access and get significant new market access in return – and do this in services as well. You think? (continue reading…)

(Frank Vargo, the National Association of Manufacturers’s vice president for international economic affairs, is blogging from Geneva this week at the ministerial meeting of the WTO. This is his first report.)

This afternoon, Monday, November 30, 2009, marks the official start of the 2009 Geneva Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Whether by design or coincidence, the Ministerial starts on the 10th anniversary of the failed Seattle Ministerial, which opened on November 30th, 1999. November 2009 is also the 8th anniversary of the launch of the Doha Round of trade negotiations.

I am in Geneva, and I was at Seattle. There are similarities and differences. The anti-globalization protests at Seattle were vicious, lengthy, and very destructive. So far, the protests in Geneva have been relatively mild, with some destruction, but limited to a small minority of the demonstrators. We’ll see what happens today.

There are also similarities in the status of the negotiations. The Seattle Ministerial failed not because of the demonstrators but because of failure to reach agreement – principally between the United States and Europe over agriculture and sectoral agreements in industrial trade. Agriculture seems, after eight years of negotiation, to be agreed but for a handful (albeit a difficult handful) of issues, but the sectoral trade agreements (eliminating tariffs in major industrial sectors) is still an unresolved issue.

The Ministerial meeting that starts today ostensibly is not for the purpose of negotiating the Doha Round. Instead the official focus is on reviewing the WTO’s activities and its contribution to development. In talking with people, though, it is clear that Doha is the big undercurrent. The hope is that with so many trade ministers gathered in one place, informal discussions can lead to a narrowing of differences among countries that can clear the way for negotiations early next year.

If those differences are not narrowed, it will be extremely difficult to wrap up the Doha Round in 2010, which is the current objective (the first goal was 2005). The differences are still profound. In the key area of manufactured goods, which comprise about 70 percent of world trade in goods and services, the gulf that has been there since the round started is still there: The advanced developing countries are unwilling to provide major cuts in their tariffs and trade barriers.

(continue reading…)